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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL

LEGAL

DEFENSE

MALPRACTICE

ATTORNEYS

IN

OHIo-Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058

(1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The criminal attorney must [have] knowledge and skill not usually expected of the ordinary civil practitioner". 1 This is because criminal law is a unique area subject to rules distinct from those applicable
to civil cases.2 The pleadings and discovery processes in civil and criminal cases are subject to different rules.' Likewise, the scope of depositions in criminal cases is not the same as that allowed in civil cases."
These and other differences can be attributed to one major source. The
civil practitioner's concerns are for the client's economic status while
the criminal attorney's concerns are for the client's liberty and, occasionally, the client's life.5 The inadequacy of criminal defense attorneys
compelled one court to comment, "[flatal or not, legal malpractice in
criminal cases is all too common." 6
Liability for malpractice in criminal defense has not been addressed by many courts, although legal malpractice suits brought
against criminal attorneys have increased in the past decade.' Courts
1. 2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 21.1 (3d. ed 1989).
2. Id.
3. Id. The scope of discovery is not the same as that allowed in civil cases. See United
States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1287, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971). State counterparts to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have no application in criminal cases. See Bailey v. State,
227 Ark. 889, 892, 302 S.W.2d 796, 798, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 851 (1957). A statute authorizing
the taking of depositions for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence by "[a]ny party to any
action" does not authorize the taking of depositions by the defendant in a criminal case. Reed v.
Allen, 121 Vt. 202, 205, 153 A.2d 74, 76-77 (1959). Similarly, state statutes providing that the
rules of evidence in civil actions also shall apply to criminal actions have been held too narrow to
include the right to grant discovery in a criminal case under the rule of civil procedure providing
for pretrial disclosure in civil cases. See Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960).
4. Except in the limited situations provided by statute where the witness is about to leave
the state or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehension that he or she will
be unable to attend the trial, or for conditional examination of witnesses, the defendant is not
entitled to take the deposition of a prosecution witness in a criminal case, and the statute providing for taking depositions in civil cases does not apply in criminal cases. Clark v. Superior Court
of San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742-43, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (1961) (defendant may
interview prosecution witnesses, and prosecution has no right to instruct such witnesses not to talk
to defendant or his attorney).
5. See 2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 1, at 284.
6. In re Greenfield, II Cal. App. 3d 536, 544, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Hogan v. Peters, 181 Ga. App. 670, 670, 353 S.E.2d 601, 601 (1987) ("defendant who plead guilty to murder, burglary and forgery and received life sentence plus 30 years,
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differ on the rules that should be applied, to criminal malpractice actions. Some courts require the same elements of proof for all legal malpractice actions, whether arising from criminal or civil matters. 8 Other
jurisdictions have indicated that legal malpractice actions arising from
criminal matters should be subject to different rules. 9
In Krahn v. Kinney,"0 the Ohio Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider the question of an attorney's liability for legal malpractice in the criminal defense context. The court held that a plaintiff
does not have to allege a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction
in order to state an action for legal malpractice in the criminal context. 1 The court also outlined the elements of a cause of action for
legal malpractice arising from criminal proceedings. "To plead a cause
of action for attorney malpractice arising from criminal representation,
a plaintiff must allege (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to
a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused
' 2
by the breach."'
This casenote first examines the court's decision to reject the
Weaver v. Carson'3 rule which required a reversal of conviction as a
prerequisite to a criminal malpractice suit. Second, this note examines
the court's application of the doctrine of res judicata as a bar to recovery in the Krahn case. Third, this note discusses the likely impact of

brought legal malpractice action against attorney"); Drury v. Fawer, 527 So. 2d 423, 424 (La. Ct.
App. 1988) (client alleged that attorney failed to make post-trial motions, and failed to object to
the judge's remarks); Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 163 Mich. App. 712, 415 N.W.2d 286 (1987) (defendant who was found guilty of criminal sexual conduct brought malpractice action against attorney for failure to request hearing, to engage in complete discovery and to follow his advice to
waive the right to a jury trial).
8. See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("the legal standards
for ineffective assistance of counsel in McCord's criminal proceeding and for legal malpractice in
this action are equivalent"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307,
313-14 (Mo. 1977) ("We conclude that it was not a condition to maintaining that suit that the
judgment of conviction be set aside."); Tijerina v. Wennermark, 700 S.W-.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) ("the same standards applicable to legal malpractice in a civil case would also be
applicable to legal malpractice in a criminal case"); see generally Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.
Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973) ("An Illinois court might
well hold, as a matter of law, that a criminal conviction cannot support a malpractice claim unless
the plaintiff is able to establish his actual innocence."); Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173,
511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (1987) ("To state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from
negligent representation in a criminal proceeding, plaintiff must allege his innocence . . .of the
underlying offense."); Weaver v. Carson, 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 101, 404 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (1979)
(convicted defendant does not state a claim for malpractice against his attorney unless he alleges a
reversal of the conviction); cf Zweifel v. Zenge & Smith, 703 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(allegations of reversal noted).
10. 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).
I1. Id. at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
12. Id.
13. 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 404 N.E.2d 1344 (1979).
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Krahn on Ohio law regarding an attorney's liability for malpractice in
the criminal defense context. Finally, this note proposes a solution to

attorney incompetence that can prevent attorney malpractice actions.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Kinney,1 4

In Krahn v.
the Shaffer Amusement Company operated
a gambling device in the High Spirits Lounge,1" a bar owned by High

Spirits, Inc., and managed by Lynn Krahn.16 Krahn was charged with
misdemeanor gambling offenses arising from payments made to players

who received credits on the machine. 17 High Spirits was cited for a
violation of the regulations of the Ohio Department of Liquor
Control.18
Lynn Krahn and the owners of the bar hired Winfield Kinney to
represent them.19 During pretrial negotiations with Kinney, the prosecutor offered to dismiss charges against Krahn if she would testify
against the Shaffer Amusement Company.2 0 Kinney, however, failed to

inform Krahn of the prosecutor's offer of dismissal.2" Kinney also can-

celed Krahn's request for a trial by jury.22
On the day of the trial, Kinney advised Krahn that the charge
against her was a minor misdemeanor and that she should change her
plea from not guilty to guilty.2" Krahn took Kinney's advice and the
other charges were dismissed.2 4 Krahn later learned, however, that the
charge was not a minor misdemeanor as Kinney had told her. Rather,
the charge to which she was advised to plead guilty was a first degree
25
misdemeanor.

14.
15.
16.
17.
Kinney,
18.
19.
meanor.
20.
21.

43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).
Id. at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
Id.
Id. The bar was raided by the police and they seized the gambling device. Krahn v.
No. 86-10413 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
43 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
Id. Krahn was charged with two first degree misdemeanors and one minor misdeId.
Id.
Id. at 104, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
I22.
d. Kinney did not appear at a hearing before the Ohio Liquor Commission to defend
the violation notice against High Spirits. Id. at 104, 538 N.E.2d at 1060. The Commission entered
a default order requiring High Spirits to pay $2,100 or have its license suspended for twenty-one
days. Id. High Spirits hired new counsel who took action which ultimately reduced the fine from
$2,100 to $1,400 and reduced the suspension alternative from twenty-one days to fourteen days.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Krahn and High Spirits did not know that Kinney also was representing the Shaffer
Amusement Company in its efforts to recover the machine. Id. at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059. Krahn
was fined $100 as a result of her guilty plea. Krahn v. Kinney, No. 86-10413 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec:
22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
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Krahn subsequently hired another attorney who filed a motion to
vacate the judgment based upon Kinney's failure to communicate the

in exchange for Krahn's testiprosecutor's offer to dismiss charges
27
mony. 6 The motion was denied.
Lynn Krahn sued attorney Kinney and the law firm of Kinney &

Coughlin for malpractice.28 She alleged that, as a result of Kinney's
actions, she was convicted of a first degree misdemeanor, suffered the
disgrace of a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude, had her
good name and reputation damaged, and suffered emotional distress.

"The trial court granted summary judgment to the [defendants] and
dismissed the complaint because . . . Krahn failed to set forth a claim
upon which relief could be granted since she did not" claim that she
had obtained a reversal, of her conviction based on ineffective assistance

of counsel.30 Lynn Krahn challenged the summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.3 1 The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, 32 and certified the record to the Supreme Court for review and
final resolution in light of conflict with a decision of the Court of Ap3
peals for Cuyahoga County in Weaver v. Carson."

In a unanimous decision, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's ruling.3 4 The supreme court determined that the same
elements of proof are applicable to "all legal malpractice actions,
whether arising from criminal or from civil representation." 5 The
court also determined that to state a cause of action for. legal malpractice arising from criminal representation, a plaintiff does not have to
claim that his or her conviction has been reversed. 3 6 Finally, the court

26. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 104, 538 N.E.2d at 1060.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
29. Id. at 104, 538 N.E.2d at 1060.
30. Id. Another reason the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants was
because "the denial of Krahn's motion to vacate the criminal judgment acted as res judicata to
bar the determination of the issues raised in the attorney malpractice action." Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 404 N.E.2d 1344 (1979). The appellate court determined that the
facts of this case placed Krahn's claim outside the rule of Weaver v. Carson. Krahn v. Kinney,
No. 86-10413 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). The rule is not
justified when the plaintiff does not assert her innocence, but rather asserts instead that her attorney's misconduct deprived her of an opportunity to have the charges against her dismissed in
return for her cooperation in another case. Id. The court noted that in'the context of a claim of
innocence, the rule of Weaver v. Carson may be appropriate. Id. Finally, the court determined
that under the circumstances of this case, an appeal would not have been useful. Id. The court
stated that "Krahn's damage is not a bungled opportunity for vindication, but a lost opportunity
to minimize her criminal record." Id.
34. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 108, 538 N.E.2d at 1063.
35. Id. at 105, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
36. ld. at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
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determined that the facts in Krahn prevented the use of collateral estoppel as a bar to Krahn's cause of action.3 7
III.

BACKGROUND

The historical development of an attorney's liability for malpractice was influenced by the English common law of negligence"8 that
first emerged within the context of individuals who claimed to be competent in their professions."
Although a right of action for attorney negligence was recognized
as early as the eighteenth century, the concept initially remained relatively dormant,'0 due partly to judicial belief that members of their
profession had to be protected from liability. 41 This thinking gave way
in the 1767 decision of Pitt v. Yalden,'2 in which the court addressed
whether an attorney could be liable for an error of judgment.' 3
In Pitt, the court recognized that an attorney did not guarantee
-results but it had difficulty devising plausible explanations for why an
error or mistake should not be adequate for liability. As a result, the
court held that the attorney could be liable only for "gross negligence"
and not for an "honest mistake."" The standard of care applicable to
attorneys developed into the distinction between an error of judgment,
which was characterized as an honest mistake, and "gross or culpable
negligence," which was the basis for liability. 5 This dichotomy was
recognized in an early English case by Chief Justice Abbott when he
stated that "God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney, or
a counsel, or even a judge is bound to know all the law .... "
A more precise standard of care finally emerged in Lanphier v.
Phipos'7 where the court stated:

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 107, 538 N.E.2d at 1063.
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959).
Id.
Comment, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence: An Alabama Perspective, 7 CUMB.
L. REV. 69 (1976).
41. Id.
42. 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (1767).
43. Id. at 75.
44. Id.
45. Id. Lord Mansfield stated:
[tihat part of the profession which is carried on by attornies [sic] is liberal and reputable,
as well as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honour and integrity:
and they ought to be protected where they act to the best of their skill and knowledge. But
every man is liable to error: and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted,
that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake . . ..
Id.
46. Montrious v. Jefferys, 172 Eng. Rep. 51, 53 (1825).
47. 173 Eng. Rep. 581 (K.B. 1838).
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Every person who enters a learned profession undertakes to bring to the
exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case...
nor does he undertake to use the highest possible degree of skill. There
may be persons who have higher education and greater advantage than
he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable, and competent
degree of skill ...

Thus it appeared that English courts were willing to hold attorneys to a
reasonable degree of skill and care.
In the United States, the first reported case of legal malpractice
49
was the 1776 decision in Stephens v. White. The defendant attorney
argued that he had not been paid for his work and thus no duty had
arisen. The court rejected his argument by stating that "the appellee
undertook to conduct the suit, and in his management of it, was guilty
of such a neglect of his duty as to subject the plaintiff to a loss; after
consideration. 50
this, it is not competent to him to allege a want of
The result of Stephens was that plaintiffs were not required to allege
payment of a fee in order to state a cause of action for legal
malpractice. 51
The American theory was further developed in 1879. In Savings
Bank v. Ward,52 the defendant attorney was hired by a real estate
buyer to examine the grantor's title to determine whether the property
53
was sufficient security for a loan. The attorney informed the plaintiff5 ' The bank accepted the property as sebank that the title was good.
5
curity and loaned the alleged owner $3,500.1 Thereafter, the bank was
informed that the borrower was insolvent and did not own the property. 56 The court held that since there was no fraud or collusion by the
attorney nor privity of contract between the attorney and the bank, the
57
attorney was not'liable for any loss sustained by reason of the loan.
In Ward, Justice Clifford set forth the professional liability standard for all attorneys:
When a person adopts the legal profession, and assumes to exercise its

48. Id. at 583.
49. 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 260 (1796).
50. Id. at 269-70.
51. See, e.g., Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 575, 66 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1951) (attorney who
voluntarily agrees to render services without immediate compensation is liable for results of improper practices and is estopped from alleging lack of consideration as a defense).
52. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
53. Id. at 196.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 205-06.
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duties in behalf of another for hire, he must be understood as promising
to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of
such duties; and if injury results to the client from a want of such a
degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney may be held to respond
in damages to the extent of the injury sustained.5 8

The court outlined two requirements for professional liability. The first
was privity. 9 The second was representation only to the best of the
attorney's knowledge.6" Because the latter was a subjective standard
that took each attorney's individual ability into consideration, Justice
Clifford attempted to clarify:
Unless the client is injured by the deficiencies of his attorney, he cannot
maintain any action for damages; but if he is injured, the true rule is
that the attorney is liablefor the want of such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment.
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is
to his client and not to a third party . . . .61

The significance of Ward is two-fold. First, it established a professional
liability standard based upon the concept of duty; for an attorney to be
liable, there must be a breach of the duty owed by the attorney to his
client with the result being some form of damages.6 2 Second, the case
was highly influential; the standard was widely accepted without alteration for approximately eighty years.
Since the 1960s, the doctrine of legal malpractice has developed
alongside other doctrines of negligence. Since legal malpractice encompasses the negligent rendering of professional services, courts generally
58. Id. at 198. Justice Clifford added:
Proof of employment and the want of reasonable care and skill are prerequisites to the
maintenance of the action; but it must not be understood that an attorney is liable for every
mistake that may occur in practice, or that he may be held responsible to his client for
every error of judgment in the conduct of his client's cause. Instead of that, the rule is that
if he acts with a proper degree of skill, and with reasonable care and to the best of his
knowledge, he will hot be held responsible.
Id.
59. Id. at 200. The rule that emerged from the United States Supreme Court in this case
was that an attorney was only liable to those with whom he was in privity of contract. Id. The
Supreme Court refused to allow recovery to injured third parties because it believed that elimination of the privity requirement would expose attorneys to unlimited liability. Id. at 202. However,
some courts have disagreed with the Supreme Court and have extended the attorney's liability to
injured third parties. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1976); Hansen v. Wightmann, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
60. Ward, 100 U.S. at 199-200.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id.
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63
agree that legal malpractice is a form of negligence. Modern courts
consistently have held that if a malpractice action is brought in negligence, the client must prove: (1) there was an attorney-client reldtionship giving rise to a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal relationship and (4) damages.64

A.

An Attorney-Client Relationship Giving Rise to a Duty

The purpose of liability for attorney malpractice was to protect
and compensate clients who were denied effective representation due to
the negligence of their attorneys. 5 As one author noted, "the attorney's
66
liability for negligence arises out of the attorney-client relationship."
The relationship between attorney and client establishes the attordiligence. 67
ney's duty to possess and exercise reasonable care, skill and
68
This duty is often referred to as a standard of care. The standard of
care that a lawyer must meet is determined by the conduct of a reason69
able person in the same or similar circumstances. This reasonableness
standard has been expressed in several ways. First, reasonableness has
been expressed as the use of "such skill, care and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment." 7 Second, reasonableness has been defined
as the use of "a reasonable degree of care or skill and to possess to a
63. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33, 43 (6th Cir. 1979) ("An attorney, like any
other professional, is liable for acts of negligence in the conduct of his professional work."); Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal. App. 3d 970, 975, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1978) ("It is the current
view in California that a legal malpractice suit is but one variety of negligence action and is
governed by the general doctrines of pleading and proof prevailing in negligence actions."). There
are other legal malpractice actions cognizable in some jurisdictions under appropriate circumstances. Legal malpractice actions can be brought in contract. See Wade, supra note 38, at 756.
In some instances, an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be maintained.
See, e.g., Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Va. 1989) (emotional distress action
allowed under Virginia law only where outrageous conduct causes physical injury), affd, 900 F.2d
256 (1990).
64. See, e.g., Sammons v. Garner, 284 Ala. 131, 133, 222 So. 2d 717, 718 (1969); Shehade
v. Gerson, 148 III. App. 3d 1026, 1029, 500 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1986), appeal denied, 106 Ill. Dec.
56, 505 N.E.2d 362 (1987); Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 205, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973); Trice v.
Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10, 13 (1986).
65. Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1963).
66. Wade, supra note 38, at 756.
67. Id. For a general discussion of the elements of a legal malpractice action, see Comment,
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. UL. REv. 408 (1977); Comment, .supranote 40,
at 69.
68. Comment, supra note 67, at 409. The author observes that some courts include a subjective element in the standard of care for attorneys-an attorney is required to use his best
judgment or act to the best of his knowledge. Other courts include an objective element which
compares the attorney's performance against the performance of other lawyers in similar circumstances. Id.
69. See Comment, supra note 67, at 409.
70. Ward, 100 U.S. at 200.
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reasonable extent the knowledge requisite to a proper performance of
his duties.""1 A third statement of an attorney's standard of care was
enunciated in Hodges v. Carter:"z
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others similarly
situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise

reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in
the application of his knowledge to his client's cause."'

These variations of the attorney's standard of care indicate that courts
are not in agreement concerning the standard that should be used. 4
In determining whether an attorney has the duty of care, courts
consider whether the attorney exercised judgment in good faith and in
the client's best interest. 75 Diligence and good faith often vitiate an unfavorable result. 76 Good faith does not prevent malpractice recovery,
but the lack of good faith occasionally increases the possibility of malpractice liability.7 7
B.. Breach of Duty
Courts agree that an attorney does not insure or guarantee the
correctness of his or her work. 78 The attorney is liable only for the failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence. Whether an attorney has
breached the standard of care is treated by most courts as a question of
fact for the jury.79 The rationale for this approach is that it reduces
71. Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 483-84, 226 P.2d 487, 498 (1951); cf. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 148 (1849) ("An attorney is not bound to extraordinary diligence. He is bound to
reasonable skill and diligence.").
72. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
.73. Id. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
74. Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 774-75 (1967).
75. See, e.g., Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. at 483-84, 226 P.2d at 498; William v. Knox, 10
N.J. Super. 384, 385, 76 A.2d 712, 715 (1950).
76. Talbot v. Schroeder, 13 Ariz. App. 230, 475 P.2d 520, 520 (1970).
77. See Strauss v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 30 Misc. 2d 345, 347, 216 N.Y.S.2d 861,
864 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1961).
78. See, e.g., McCartney v. Wallace, 214 Ill. App. 618, 624 (1919) ("Attorneys do not
guarantee that their judgment is infallible, and are not necessarily negligent because they do not
discover all decisions on a subject or may question their finality."); Purves v. Landell, 8 Eng. Rep.
1332, 1337 (H.L. 1845) ("The professional adviser has never been supposed to guarantee the
soundness of his advice.").
79. See, e.g., Walker v. Goodman & Mitchell, 21 Ala. 647, 650 (1852) ("The degree of
negligence necessary to charge him is a question of fact for the jury."); Hampel-Lawson Merc.
Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 277 S.W. 29 (1925) (lower court improperly passed on the standard of
care issue as a matter cf law); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 333, 18 A. 698, 701(1889) (In an
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judicial interference with a traditional jury function.80 In addition,
since jurors evaluate the actions of other professionals, they should be
81
able to evaluate the conduct of attorneys. The disadvantage of this
approach is that it may allow jurors to make an uninformed judgment
2
based on their non-legal experiences.8
Occasionally, a court may indicate that the application of the stan83
dard is a question of law to be decided by the court. It is argued that
judges are experts in legal matters and are more competent than lay84
jurors to determine whether an attorney breached a duty of care. Another argument is that since the judge traditionally controls the conduct of attorneys, liability for legal malpractice-another form of at85
torney control-also should be handled by the judge. This approach is
not without its disadvantages. If judges determine attorney negligence,
they may apply the standard of care too lightly because of concern for
their colleagues. 8 6 On the other hand, judges may be harsh in applying
the standard of care because they want to maintain a high caliber of
attorneys.87 Ordinarily, in a majority of states, the determination of
whether an attorney breached the standard of care is a question of fact
for the jury. 8
C. Causal Relationship
Even if an attorney is found to have breached a legally recognized
duty, the client still must demonstrate that the breach actually caused
his or her injury.89 A client is required to prove that the result in the
prior litigation would have been different "but for" the attorney's negligence.9 The burden of proof for causation is therefore on the client-

action of this nature, the court must let the jury determine the attorney's negligence.).
80. Note, supra note 74 at 778.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 760, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct.
1948) ("[N]o question of fact is involved but . . . the matter is one of pure law and . . . it would
be improper to submit to a jury of lay persons the question whether the advice was correct, or, if
incorrect, whether in view of the state of law on the subject the defendant was guilty of
negligence.").
84. See Note, supra note 74, at 777.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See cases cited supra note 79.
89. For a general discussion of causation see Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in
Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidson, 489 So. 2d 572, 573 (Ala. 1986); Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435
So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983); Piper v. Green, 216 Ill. App. 590 (1920); Cooper v. Simon, 719
S.W.2d 463, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); Utterback-Gleason Co.
v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 193 A.D. 646, 652, 184 N.Y.S. 862, 866 (1920), affid, 233 N.Y.
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plaintiff.9 If the client-plaintiff would have lost the prior suit, notwithstanding the negligence of the attorney, the negligence is not the cause
of the injury and the attorney is not liable. 92 If the client-plaintiff lost
the prior action, he must show that the prior claim was a valid one. 93 If
the prior action was unsuccessful and the attorney negligently failed to
appeal, the client is required to show that the appeal would have been
successful. 94 If a defense was omitted, the client must show it was a
valid one. 95 Although a few courts have held that if a case was lost
because of attorney negligence, the burden was on the attorney to show
that the cause of action was an invalid one, 6 the law is now settled that
the plaintiff has the burden of proof. 97
D.

Damages
.If a client proves that an attorney breached the standard of care
and that the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of the client's injuries, the court or jury still is faced with the issue of damages. 98 The measure of damages is compensation for the injury suffered
by the plaintiff, and the burden is on -the plaintiff to prove the
damages. 99
If the negligence caused the plaintiff to lose title to property, the
measure of recovery is the value of the property. 100 If it caused one to
overlook an outstanding lien, the measure is the cost of eliminating the
lien. ' If the negligence occurred while conducting litigation, the measure of damages is the amount which would have been recovered "but
for" the attorney's negligence."0 2
E.

Criminal Malpractice
Criminal defense attorneys like their civil counterparts are held to

549, 135 N.E. 913 (1922).
91. See Wade, supra note 38, at 770.
92. See Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225,
235-36 (1958).
93. See Piper v. Green, 216 II1. App. 590 (1920).
94. See Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882, 894-95 (S.D. Ohio 1881); General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.2d- 155, 158 (1950).
95. See Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935); cf. Haggerty v. Watson,
302 N.Y. 707, 709, 98 N.E.2d 586, 586 (1951).
96. See Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss. 268, 288 (1845); Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 493,
496 (1869).
97. See Wade, supra note 38, at 770.
98. See Note, supra note 65, at 1307.
99. See Quinn v. Van Pelt, 56 N.Y. 417, 419 (1874).
100. See Whitney v. Abbott, 191 Mass. 59, 64, 77 N.E. 524, 525 (1906).
101. See Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934); Bayerl v. Smyth, 117 N.J.L.
412, 189 A. 93 (1937).
102. See McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 115 N.E. 481 (1917).
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a duty of reasonable care and must exercise ordinary skill, knowledge
and diligence.10 3 A client also must prove that the attorney's negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury resulting from the underlying
0
criminal proceeding. "
Where the plaintiff's malpractice action is grounded on the criminal defense attorney's failure to achieve an acquittal on one or more
charges, the fact that there is a basis for a finding of plaintiff's guilt on
the record generally has been deemed to be sufficient to deny the mal-

practice claim. 0 6 As a California court of appeals recognized, "a crimi-

nal defendant whose conviction has not been reversed, or whose sen-

tence has not been modified after a challenge has been made on

competency-of-counsel grounds, has a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to overcome in trying to show any damage resulted from the alleged
malpractice." 10 6
Where the malpractice action has nothing to do with the former
client's guilt or innocence, however, the attorney may have proximately
107 Some
caused the client's injury despite the client's supposed guilt.
courts, however, have held that the client failed to establish the element
of proximate cause. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, for example,
held that "proximate cause" was not established where clients asserted
the negligent failure of their defense attorneys to appeal a denial-of
bond, but failed to show that they could have posted the bond if it had.
in fact been set.10 8
Furthermore, the Federal District Court for New Jersey, the New

103. The discussion here involves actions for negligence and does not include claims for
ineffective assistance of counsel. There is a difference between the two concepts. Ineffective assistance of counsel involves a.denial of due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, or the right to assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). A malpractice action involves only the determination of negligence as the proximate cause of the client's injuries. Lange v. Marshall, 622
S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo..Ct. App. 1981). Although the standards for determining ineffective assistance of counsel differ among jurisdictions, some courts now use a standard similar to that used in
attorney malpractice actions. Compare Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146
(1954) (legal malpractice action holding attorneys to a standard of "reasonable skill and dili-.
gence") with DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1202 (ineffective assistance of counsel action holding that "a
defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent
conscientious advocate") (emphasis omitted).
104. See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); Tijerina v. Wennermark, 700 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
105. Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978); Claudio v. Heller; 119
Misc. 2d 432, 463 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
106. Bledstein v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 152, 174, 208 Cal. Rptr. 428, 442
(1984).
107. See, e.g., Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 485, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (malpractice
claim with respect to criminal defense attorney's excessive fee), aff d in part and vacated in part,
713 F.2d 14 (1983).
108. Wabaunsee v. Harris, 610 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1980).
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Hampshire Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court all
have held that a defendant's act of suicide following a criminal conviction cannot be causally linked to the defense counsel's alleged negligence as a matter of law.' 09 The Pennsylvania Superior Court reasoned
that suicide is "an act so extraordinary as not to be reasonably foresee-,
able and thus . . . it is not the type of harm that can proximately result from [criminal defense counsel's] ordinary negligence." 11 0
Some courts have imposed an additional requirement on plaintiffs
alleging negligence in criminal representation. In addition to proving
proximate cause, the client also must prove his or her actual innocence
as an element of legal malpractice in order to recover."' In some jurisdictions, the client must obtain a reversal of the underlying criminal
conviction as a prerequisite to bringing a legal malpractice action." 2
F. Defenses to Criminal Malpractice
Historically, the most common defense to a cause of action for
malpractice has been the statute of limitations."' Additionally, the defense of contributory negligence on the client's part occasionally prevents recovery."" An increasingly common defense to criminal malpractice, however, is collateral estoppel based upon the judgment of
conviction."15 A client may be precluded from suing the attorney for
malpractice if the client unsuccessfully raised the issue of the attorney's
negligence in a prior suit. A number of jurisdictions have held that the
client is barred because the issue already has been adjudicated.'"
109. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123
N.H. 335, 461 A.2d 123 (1983); McPeake v. Cannon, 381 Pa. Super 227, 553 A.2d 439 (1989).
110. McPeake, 381 Pa. Super at 234, 553 A.2d at 442.
111. Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973); Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d
169, 173, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (1987).
112. E.g., Weaver v. Carson, 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 101, 404 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (1979); see
also Zweifel v. Zenge & Smith, 703 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
113. See, e.g., Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in California:A Shaky Citadel. 10
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 257 (1970); Comment, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations
in Legal Malpractice Actions, 15 UCLA L. REV. 320 (1967).
114. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 530, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598
(1966); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961).
115. See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); Johnson v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 825, 826-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Johnson v.
Raban, 702 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 355-56,
308 N.E.2d 439, 442, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (1974). Collateral estoppel and estoppel by judgment are two components of the doctrine of res judicata. Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio
St. 2d 108, 112, 254 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1969). Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an issue
that has been actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action. Estoppel by judgment prevents a party from relitigating a cause of action after a prior court has rendered a final
judgment on the merits of that cause as to that party. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc.,
2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 195, 443 N.E.2d 978, 981 (1983).
116. See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 609 (D.C; Cir. 1980) (legal standards for
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IV.. 'ANALYSIS
A.

The Ohio Supreme Court's Rejection of Weaver v. Carson

In Krahn v. Kinney,11 7 the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the rule
of Weaver v. Carson that a reversal of an underlying criminal conviction must be obtained before a criminal malpractice action can be
maintained:118

we hold that a plaintiff need not allege a reversal of his or her conviction
in order to state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from.
representation in a criminal proceeding. To plead a cause of action for
attorney malpractice arising from criminal representation, a plaintiff
must allege (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty, (2) a
breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the
breach.1 1 9
Krahn met all the traditional requirements for a legal malpractice
claim. She had an attorney-client relationship that gave rise to a
duty. 2 Kinney breached that duty by failing to inform Krahn of the
prosecutor's first offer, canceling her request for a jury trial, failing to
21 and failing to
show up at the Ohio Liquor Commission's hearing,
inform Krahn that she had, an opportunity to receive a lesser sentence. 122 Kinney's inaction was ihe proximate cause of Krahn's injury
2 Her damages were the
which was to plead guilty to a higher charge.
2
damage to her good name, severe emotional distress " and a stiffer
penalty of $100.126 The court's rationale focused on the unfairness of
rule.' 26
the application of the additional requirement of the "reversal"
In adopting the language of the court below, the supreme court agreed
that it would be unjust to require a plaintiff to obtain a reversal of his
or her conviction as a prerequisite to a malpractice suit since the injury
in this situation "is not a bungled opportunity for vindication, but a lost
ineffective assistance of counsel in plaintiff's criminal proceeding are equivalent to legal malpractice standards), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 308
N.E.2d 439, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1975) (applying collateral estoppel to plaintiff's'charge that defense counsel coerced him into pleading guilty based on the court's earlier denial of the motion to
vacate the guilty plea).
117. 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).
118. Id. at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
121. Id. at 103-04, 538 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 104, 538 N.E.2d at 1060.
125. Krahn v. Kinney, No. 86-10413 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
126. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
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27
opportunity to minimize her criminal record.'
The breach of duty asserted by Krahn against her attorney Kinney
had nothing to do with her guilt or innocence at trial. Her claim focused on the fact that Kinney did not inform her of the prosecutor's
offer to dismiss the suit in exchange for her testimony. 1 8 It was therefore an opportunity to avoid going to trial that was lost to Kinney as a
12 9
result of her attorney's actions.
The "reversal" test focuses on whether the client would have prevailed in the underlying action 8 0 and ignores attorney negligence in
pre-trial negotiations in the criminal setting and settlement discussions
in the civil context. By rejecting the "reversal" test, the supreme court
tacitly recognized that malpractice can occur both within and outside
the courtroom.
The supreme court in Krahn did not, however, completely close the
door to the "reversal" requirement. It recognized that failure to obtain
a reversal still may be important in certain factual circumstances. 31
The court noted that "in most cases the failure to secure a reversal of
the underlying criminal conviction may bear upon and even destroy the
plaintiff's ability to establish the element of proximate cause." 2 The
court determined that Krahn's failure to set aside her conviction resolved the issue of proximate cause against her with respect to her
claim that she pled guilty after receiving poor advice as to the seriousness of the charge.' 3
In rejecting the application of the "reversal" rule, the court undermined the holding of Weaver v. Carson.z' 4 The court in Weaver held
that in addition to proving the traditional elements of legal
malpractice,

where the claim is that lawyer malpractice caused a criminal conviction,
the cause of action is not complete, nor is the statement of it complete,
unless the plaintiff alleges two additional facts to establish damage:
(1) that his conviction has been reversed based on the ineffective
assistance of counsel; and either
(2) that on the remand for a new trial his case was either dismissed
on the merits or tried with a resulting acquittal; or
(3) that his conviction, actually guilty or not, could not have been
127. Id. at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061. A similar situation in civil litigation occurs when the
attorney fails to take advantage of a settlement offer. Id.
128. Id. at 104,538 N.E.2d at 1059.
129. Id. at 103, 538 N.E.2d at 1059.
130. Weaver v. Carson, 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 404 N.E.2d 1344 (1979).
131. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 106 n.7, 538 N.E.2d at 1062 n.7.
134. 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 404 N.E.2d 1344 (1979).
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achieved but for the ineptitude of his counsel and was unassailable on retrial due entirely to the same cause."'
There are several public policy justifications for requiring "reversal of
the underlying conviction" as an element of legal malpractice actions. 13 6 First, the requirement discourages incarcerated persons from
occupying their time in prison by pursuing civil actions against their
former attorneys. 13 Second, the central issue regarding causation is
usually the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence and the criminal
justice system with its procedural safeguards minimizes the prejudicial
effect of counsel's error. 3 8
A major disadvantage of the "innocence" requirement is that the
criminal defendant has a burden that his civil counterpart does not.
The latter only has to prove that "but for" the attorney's negligence he
or she should have achieved a better result."3 9
- There is a significant practical difference between these two burdens of proof.' 40 In the civil context, the function of the jury is to determine ultimate facts 4 1 by weighing all the evidence to determine in
whose favor the preponderance of evidence lies.' The plaintiff, to prevail in a civil malpractice action, need only demonstrate that the preponderance of evidence would have been in his favor in the prior
suit."' 3 The function of the jury in a criminal trial is different.'" The
jury does not determine in whose favor the preponderance of evidence
lies, but rather whether "the state has proved that the accused is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." I" Therefore, the fact that the jury did not
convict a criminal defendant does not necessarily mean that it considered him or her innocent of the crime.1 46 7All it means is that the state
failed to meet its high burden of proof."
The jury in a criminal malpractice action examines the evidence as
if it were trying a criminal case."4 8 Occasionally, the result may be
unfair." 9 An example of an unfair result may occur when a criminal
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 101, 404 N.E.2d at 1346.
2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 1, § 21.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Comment, supra, note 67, at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
Id.
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defense attorney negligently fails "to object to the introduction of illegally seized evidence which would have been held inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule. ' 15 0 Even though the jury hears evidence that
proves the defendant was guilty, the jury in the malpractice action may
find that "but for" the attorney's negligence in the prior suit, the guilt
of the defendant would not have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, and thus award him damages.1 51
The rule that a client has to obtain a reversal before suing for
legal malpractice is inflexible and treats some clients unfairly when the
facts of the case fall outside malpractice in the context of a trial.' 2
The overriding element of Weaver is an allegation of innocence.' 5 3 This
element may be justified when the client claims that he or she would
not have been found guilty at trial "but for" the attorney's negligence.
However, where the client alleges malpractice outside the trial context,
the Weaver requirement is not meaningful because innocence is not at
issue. The Weaver rule places a heavy burden on the criminal defendant to prove his or her actual innocence before recovering any damages." The effect of this rule would be to grant immunity from malpractice liability to any attorney who could prove in a subsequent
malpractice action that the client is actually guilty. 5 5 Furthermore,
such immunity could be detrimental, since it may result in laxity and
56
incompetence by criminal defense attorneys.
. Unlike the rule of Weaver, the Krahn rule is flexible and requires
a court to focus on the specific facts of the case before it.' 57 The Krahn'
rule occasionally may produce an unfair result by allowing a guilty
party to sue his or her attorney for malpractice. 58 Such a result may,
however, be counterbalanced by the award of minimal damages to the
plaintiff-client. 59 Consequently, the guilty client does not profit and the
negligent attorney is punished for his or her lack of reasonable skill and
1 60
care.
B.

Res Judicata as a Defense to Criminal Malpractice
It is often asserted by criminal defense counsel in response to a

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
See Krahn, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
62 Ohio App. 2d at 101, 404 N.E.2d at 1345.
See Comment, supra note 67, at 447.
Id.
Id.
43 Ohio St. 3d at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
See Comment, supra note 67, at 447.
Id.
Id.
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former criminal client's claim of legal malpractice that such an action
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 1 1 In Krahn, the attorney
claimed that the malpractice suit was barred by res judicata because
the ineffective assistance of counsel issue was conclusively adjudicated
when the trial court denied Krahn's motion to vacate the judgment in
the criminal proceeding. 62
Res judicata encompasses the two concepts of "estoppel by judgment" and "collateral estoppel." 1 63 "Estoppel by judgment" prevents a
party from relitigating a cause of action after a prior court has ren1 64
dered a final judgment on the merits of that action as to that party.
When the plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment, the claim "merges"
into the judgment and the plaintiff cannot relitigate that, claim in a
separate action.1 6 5 Conversely, when a judgment is in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's cause of action is extinguished and the judgment
16
acts as a bar against the plaintiff's suing again on the same claim.
by judgment" is to avoid multiple litigation
The purpose of "estoppel
1 67
matter.
same
over the
The Krahn court, applying "estoppel by judgment" determined
that an action to vacate a criminal judgment based on ineffective assis1 68 The
tance of counsel is not the same as a legal malpractice action.
court noted that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is based on
constitutional guarantees and seeks reversal of a criminal conviction
while legal malpractice is a common-law tort action which seeks monefary damages. 69 The court concluded that the proof of either of these
17 0
As a
two causes of action does not necessarily establish the other.
result, "estoppel by judgment" was held not to apply to this case. 17
1
The second component of res judicata is "collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel furthers the public policy of avoiding multiple litigation over the same matter, 7 2 and acts as a bar to the relitigation of
an issue that has been "actually and necessarily litigated and deter-

161. See cases cited supra note 116 and accompanying text.
162. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 106-07, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
163. See cases cited supra note 116.
164. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
165. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir.
1978). "Estoppel by judgment" is also referred to as "claim preclusion."
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir.
1978).
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mined in a prior action." 173 The Krahn court conceded that the issue of
an attorney's incompetence resulting in a conviction can be raised and
determined in a prior criminal action where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made. 174 In this situation, collateral estoppel
could act as a bar to subsequent litigation on the issue. 175
The Krahn court determined, however, that the facts of the case
prevented the application of collateral estoppel as a bar to Krahn's
cause of action.'. 6 The trial court, in denying Krahn's motion to vacate
her conviction, "found that Krahn failed to show that her guilty plea
was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. 1 77 The trial
court did not, therefore, rule on the issue upon which Krahn's malpractice action was grounded:1 78 whether the attorney committed an impropriety by failing to inform Krahn of the offer of a plea bargain. 179 The
court held that the issues presented in the malpractice claim had not,
therefore, been "actually and necessarily litigated and determined" in
the denial of Krahn's motion to vacate the criminal judgment against
her' and the failure of Krahn's motion to vacate the criminal judgment did not act as res judicata to bar the determination of the issues
raised in the attorney malpractice action.
C.

The Impact of Krahn

The Krahn court considered the issue of legal malpractice in the
criminal context. Some courts apply the same elements to all legal malpractice actions, whether arising out of criminal or civil representation.' 8 ' Other courts have adopted the theory that "innocence" is a required element of the claim of legal malpractice in addition to the
traditional elements of negligence. 8 ' The Ohio Supreme Court has
83
chosen the former view.1
The Krahn court adopted a flexible rule to analyze legal malpractice claims based on the facts of the particular case. 84 This rule treats
clients fairly by assuring that they are not shoved out of court by a
theory that is applied across the board without considering the specific

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

43 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 538 N.E.2d at 1062.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 107, 538
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108, 538
See cases cited
See cases cited
43 Ohio St. 3d
Id. at 106, 538

N.E.2d at 1063.

N.E.2d at 1063. .
supra note 8.
supra note 9.
at 105, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
N.E.2d at 1062.
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facts of each case. Attorneys also are protected. since the client must
establish proximate cause by proving that the injury would not have
occurred "but for" the actions of the attorney."'
D. Specialization-A Method to Increase Attorney Competence
Before the Injury to the Client Occurs
In Krahn v. Kinney, the Ohio Supreme Court outlined the elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from criminal
proceedings.' 88 The ability of a client to bring a malpractice action
against an attorney is therefore one restraint on an attorney's conduct.
Malpractice actions, however, do not solve the problem of incompetent
may be to inattorneys. The solution to the "incompetence" problem
187
occurs.
client
the
to
injury
before
competence
crease
Incompetent attorneys are found in every substantive field of law,
but mediocre trial attorneys present glaring examples of incompeIn 1932, the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alatence.'
89 recognized that a layman cannot have a fair trial without the
bama'
proper assistance of counsel. 9" The Court's rationale was that a layman lacks the skills necessary to assert fully rights guaranteed under
the American system of justice. 19 ' The constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel established in Powell was only applied in capital
trials, but the Supreme Court expanded the right to all cases involving
93
to
a potential loss of liberty, 92 to proceedings in advance of trial,
9 4 and to all indigent defendants. 9 '
defendants pleading guilty,
In criminal cases, procedural safeguards like habeas corpus proceedings exist to minimize injuries caused by incompetent representation, but they are laden with difficult obstacles.' 9 6 A significant obstacle
197
The
is the burden of proof that is placed on the challenger-client.
same layman whose inability to assert rights was recognized in Powell
98
now has to recognize a mistake and prove that it occurred.'

185. Id.
186. Id. at 106, 538 N.E.2d at 1061.
187. See generally Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV. 434, 439
(1975).
188. Id. at 436.
189. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
190. Id. at 68-69.
191. Id.
192. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
193. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
194. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
195. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
196. Note, supra note 188, at 437.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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In civil cases, a client who recognizes an attorney's incompetence
may not be able to prosecute a malpractice claim because of the additional time and expense involved in hiring another attorney. 199 Further,
the injured client bringing a malpractice action confronts the same obstacles facing a habeas corpus petitioner.20 0 The burden of proof is on
20 1
the client to establish a claim of malpractice.
There are justifications for the obstacles to recovery. First, attorneys cannot function effectively if they are subjected unduly to suits by
angry clients who sue every time a case is lost. 02 Second, many clients
in both civil and criminal cases expect the lawyer to win the case regardless of its merits. 20 3 At the same time, it must be recognized that
incompetent attorneys injure clients and that solutions aimed at eliminating incompetence are needed.20 4
Formal specialization in the form of state certification can help
solve the problem of attorney "incompetence." 0 5 There are several arguments in favor of specialization. First, it is in the public interest to
ensure some minimum level of competence within an organized bar.20 6
This goal can be achieved by a number of different methods 20 7 including performance evaluations by peers or judges, continuing legal education programs and examinations. 0 8 Second, specialization attempts to
satisfy the public's demand for increased efficiency and convenience.20 9
The cost of legal service would be decreased because the client would
not have to pay the attorney for hours spent researching an area of law
with which he is not familiar. 21 0 Furthermore, a potential client would
save time and effort finding an attorney since specialization would allow limited advertising. 21' The attorney's income also would be increased since specialization enhances the attorney's efficiency, thereby
allowing him or her to handle a greater number of cases.2 12
Critics argue that specialization may lessen the work load of the
non-specialist who sees the public increasingly taking their problems to
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those who specialize. 13 The opponents of specialization also argue that
acquiring the status of a specialist involves extra time and expense.214
The final argument is that specialization may increase public expectations which, if not fully met, may breed an' increase in malpractice
actions.21 5
Specialization, a solution separate and distinct from the malpractice action used to punish the incompetent attorney," 6 operates 'to -reduce the occurrence of injuries resulting from attorney incompetence.
Since specialization provides little assistance to the client who is already a victim of the attorney's errors,2" 7 and does not advance the
recovery of damages by an incompetent attorney's victims, both solutions are needed. 2' 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ohio Supreme Court in Krahn v. Kinney was presented for
the first time with the issue of legal malpractice in the criminal context 21 9 and was asked to determine whether a client must allege a reversal of an underlying conviction to state a claim for legal malpractice. 2 0 The court's adoption of the rule that imposes the same
requirements for all legal malpractice actions-civil and criminal-reflects the court's desire to protect the interests of both the plaintiff-client and the defendant-attorney. The court changed the law in
Ohio and rejected the "reversal of a conviction" approach adopted by
other jurisdictions in some fairly recent cases.2 1
Because an action for malpractice is a limited solution to the problem of attorney incompetence, the legal profession should encourage
"specialization" of criminal attorneys which protects the expectations
of clients, satisfies the public's demand for increased efficiency and convenience, and results in decreased costs for legal services. Specialization
also benefits attorneys by increasing their efficiency and allowing them
to handle a greater number of cases.
Adeniji Akintobi
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